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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-INSOLVENCY-FRAUD

AS BASIS FOR PREFERENTIAL

REPAYMENT TO DEPOSITOR WHERE BANK RELIES ON HOPE OF OUTSIDE AID-Bank A, appellant, was in financial distress on Saturday morning within the
knowledge of two of its officers. Those officers relied on the hope that Bank B

would help during the emergency, since that bank had done considerable business with bank A 1 and had aided it in previous times of stringency. Saturday
afternoon, depositor, appellee, made a deposit after closing hours. The bank
was opened on Monday and appellee made another deposit, at which time the
directors met and, learning that bank B would not help, declared bank A insolvent.2 Held, that depositor has a preference only as to the second deposit.
Denny, Banking Conmissioner -v. Thompson, decided by Kentucky Court of
Appeals, U. S. Daily, Jan. 16, I93I, at 3482.2
Preferential repayment of a deposit has generally been held to exist where
knowledge of the hopeless insolvency of a bank by its officers has made it
fraudulent to receive further deposits without notice to the depositor of the
condition of the bank.' A categorical classification, as often attempted, on
the basis of such a definition would seem impossible because of the presence
of the word "hopeless" which, chameleon-like, seems to change in accord with
its factual background.' Thus, in the principal case, the appellant bank was
additional facts, see infra, note 8.
court assumes that the directors of bank A at the beginning of the
meeting were informed that they could not rely on the other bank's assistance.
If the burden of proof is on the one seeking the preferential claim, this assumption seems incorrect since the exact moment when the bank ceased business
is not disclosed from the record, Quin v. Earle, 95 Fed. 728 (E. D. Pa. i899).
1 For

2The

ilThe

case may be discussed from the angle that a state and its political

subdivisions are entitled to a preference, the case at bar following the majority
in refusing such preference, since the appellee deposited as sheriff in an account
called "John M. Thompson, tax account", (19o6) 10 HARv. L. REV.292.
'Where courts have reached this conclusion it has been supported on one
of three possible theories: (I) that the bank is a trustee ex inalificio, Wasson
v. Hawkins, 59 Fed. 233 (C. C. Ind., 1894); Furber v. Dane, 204 Mass. 412,
go N. E. 859 (910) ; (2) that the depositor may rescind the contract because
of fraud, Steele v. Allen, 240 Mass. 394, I34 N. E. 401 (1922) ; Williams v.
Van Norden Trust Co., 1O4 App. Div. 251, 93 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1905); Cf.

Pott v. Schmucker, 84 Md. 535, 36 Atl. 592 (1897) (proving claim in insolvency
proceedings held an affirmance of contract) ; (3) that the property in the deposit remains in the depositor because of the fraud, Richardson v. Olivier, io5
Fed. 277 (C. C. A. 5th, i9oo); cf. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Solicitors
Loan and Trust Co., 188 Pa. 330, 41 Atl. 536 (1898). For excellent article see
Bolles, Deposits Received by Insolvent Bank (19o5) 52 ASIER. L. REG. 438.
' The majority of courts say that a bank receiving a deposit, knowing that
it is insolvent, has no right to use the money as its own. However, the following cases would seem to break down a categorical rule: St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 133 U. S. 566, 6o Sup. Ct. 390 (I889) (recognizing
(630)

RECENT CASES
not held hopelessly insolvent where there was hope that another bank would
help it through its difficulty. Such hope, however substantial it may seem in
anticipation,' is a rather nebulous concept upon which to rely, particularly
when no effort has been made, as was readily possible by telephone communication in the instant case, to determine whether it had any basis in fact.' If hope
of assistance from third parties is to be retained as a qualification whereby
fraud and the dependent repayment are negatived, even those courts inclined
to construe factual situations liberally in favor of the general creditors in
insolvency must observe some limitations on the acceptability of hope as a
factor in considering the existence of fraud
While current conditions to some
extent justify a consideration of economic factors rather than jurisprudential
symmetry alone, some limitation is necessary. Therefore, if a court has once
determined to accept reliance on the hope of outside assistance as an element
defeating fraud, such hope must at least be based on a promise of aid
More
conservatively, it is hoped, courts will not warrant reliance on such a promise
without security for its performance having first been obtained0
that there is no fraud where in honest opinion of officers, bank has reasonable
chance to recover by continuing in business; Howe v. Bank, x6 Ohio C. C.
N. S. 320 (1913) (to sustain fraud bank officials must know or believe bank
insolvent, and it is not sufficient that by ordinary diligence they might have
known. It would seem that the knowledge of the official must be as such, and
where official was stealing for own benefit, the knowledge is not imputed to
the bank, Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. v. Bank, 6o N. J. Eq. 84, 45 Ati. 704
(900).
I President of bank B had exercised active management and control, unofficially, over bank A; bank B discounted notes, loaned money, and -all out-oftown business for bank A, for which it liberally paid; and bank B had aided in
previous times of stringency. These facts being set out at length. in the
opinion As the basis for the court's decision, it is doubtful whether even this
court would allow reliance on hope of aid where the relationship between the
bank and other party was weaker than in the present case.
'Cashier of bank A telephoned the president of bank B Saturday morning
but there is nothing in the opinion showing that the matter of aid had been
discussed.
I The instant case, itself, would seem to illustrate the inadequacy of reliance
on hope of aid alone. The court gleans from the evidence a strong case to
show reason why the bank should be allowed to hope to rely, and yet there was
no basis in fact for such reliance. See Washington Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke, 126
Wash. 5io, 218 Pac. 232 (923),

1924 72 U. OF PA. L. Rvv. !88.

'To take the next step and allov reliance after every effort has been made
to secure the promise, without securing it, would not be sufficient. To do so
would be to regard failure as sufficient when success is essential.
10Rochester Printing Co. v. Loomis, 45 Hun. 93 (N. Y. 1887) (one judge
dissenting) aff'd without opinion in 12o N. Y. 629, 24 N. E. iio3 (189o); 2
MoRsE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 5928) § 589. In the Rochester Printing
Co. case the court, at 99, said, ".
. a man cannot honestly carry on banking
business upon a mere promise of another to carry him, without some security
for his performance of the promise. .
. At all events, whatever may be his
hope or expectation under such circumstances, lie would not necessarily be relieved from the charge of fraud in obtaining moneys which he has failed and is
unable to repay."

632

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
BROKERS-COMPENSATION-EFFECT

OF REVOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO SELL

-Defendant, the owner of premises, promised plaintiff, a broker, $200 if the
broker "got $6200 for the house". The owner wanted $I000 in cash, a second
mortgage for the balance, and he was to replace the existing mortgage with
another. The broker introduced the customer to the owner and terms were
discussed. Some evidence tended to show that the broker had authority to
"close the deal". The broker notified the owner that the customer had agreed
to pay $620o, had deposited $50, and would meet him with $i5o the next day to
draw up a written contract. The owner failed to come, refused to sell, and
refunded the deposit. Held, that the broker was not entitled to commission.
Zaks.gewski v. Kurzitzky, 173 N. E. 503 (Mass. 1930).
A real estate broker with authority to bind the owner to a contractual
2
obligation' is a type of agent, acting for and in the place of another. More
usually,' however, he is instructed merely to sell. Custom has attached to the
word "sell" a distinct connotation, i. e. to find a purchaser-which the law has
generally adopted.' With such instructions the broker differs from the ordinary
agent in that he is only the recipient of an offer of an unilateral contract.'
Whatever is the nature of the agency, the broker's right to compensation depends on his performance of the acts designated by the offer of compensation.
If he has authority to make a contract, it does not follow that this offer must
be coincident with the authority,' although the court in the principal case
seems to have assumed that it must be,' as ordinarily the two are in fact coincident. The decision, however, is based also on the fact that the broker had
not found a purchaser before the owner refused to continue the negotiations,
which seems to be all that was required by the terms of the owner's offer. It is
1 The authority must plainly appear from the owner's unequivocal words
or acts, Crumpacker v. Jeffrey, 63 Ind. App. 621, 115 N. E. 62 (1917) ; see
Swartzel, Broker's Commissions (1922) 15 LAw. & BANK. 343.
-As to the owner's right to revoke where the agency is designated "exclusive", see (1922) 70 U. OF PA. L. REV. 328.
'Of a broker who had authority to enter into a binding contract it was
said in Rutenberg v. Main, 47 Cal. 213, 220 (1874) that he was to "do more
than discharge the functions of a broker"; 2 MECHETA, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914)

§

2429.
'Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 24o (187o) ; Yadwin v.Arnold, 94 N. J. L. 500,
iO Atl. 9o3 (I92o), commented on in (1920) 5 MINN. L. REv. 73; Lewis v.
Jones, 43 S. D. 282, 178 N. W. IOOI (1920) ; Armstrong v. Oakley, 23 Wash.

oo
62 Pac. 449 (19 ) ; see Swartzel, op. cit. supra note I, at 347. Contra:
Fassbinder v. Ghergich, 156 La. 308, iio So. 436 (1924) ; Haydock v. Stow, 40
N. Y. 363 (1869).
6 MECHEM, loc. cit. supra note 3. This distinction is merely descriptive, for
in both cases unless a monetary consideration has been given, the broker is,as
regards compensation, the recipient of an offer of an unilateral contract.
'Conversely, the offer may be so framed that the commission is dependent
upon the acquisition by the owner of a binding contract, Holton v. Job Iron Co.,
204 Fed. 947 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913) ; Pfanz v. Humberg, 82 Ohio I, 91 N. E.
863 (I9IO); or upon the passing of title, Flower v. Davidson, 44 Minn. 46
(189o) ; Leschizner v. Bauman, 83 N. J. L. 743, 85 Atl. 2o5 (1912) ; or upon
the payment of the money, Beale v. Bond, 84 L. T. 313 (1887) ; or upon any
condition that the owner imposes, Chaffee v. Widman, 48 Colo. 34, lo8 Pac.
895, Barber v. Miller, 41 Pa. Super. 442 (1909).
"The offer was to pay commission if the broker "got $6200" which would
seem to be the equivalent of an instruction to sell, i. e.,to get a customer at
that price. The evidence of authority "to close the deal" appears to be independent of the offer. This is the extent of the reported evidence.
122,
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generally agreed that a purchaser has been found when he is shown to be ready,
able and willing to buy' at the owner's terms.' Where the owner subsequently
has withdrawn his offer, either expressly or by a sale to another customer,1
the fact that an ultimate agreement between the owner and the broker's customer would have been consummated is necessarily uncertain and conjecturalV'
Consequently the lack of harmony as to what constitutes willingness is not
astonishing. It is everywhere the broker's burden' to prove willingness and
ability. Some courts require a binding contract or at least a written offer' but
the majority deem it sufficient that the prospective purchaser be introduced to
the owner or called to his attention so that the possibility of a binding contract
As regards the fact of ability to
is present if he chooscs .to effectuate it.
Generally more than solvency
purchase there are few guiding principles.'
The purchaser need not have the cash on hand,", but he
must be shown'
cannot depend on a resale to obtain it.' On the whple the decisions indicate
that the good faith of the owner's revocation is a factor of no little importance.
The broker must show conclusively that a sale would have resulted had the
owner desired it unless it appears that he has been encouraged to expend time
and effort and there are suggestions of the owner's bad faith? The fact, that
the broker failed to show convincingly that his alleged purchaser acquiesced
in the details of the offer,' makes it unlikely that the instant case would be
differently decided in most jurisdictions.
' Desmond v. Stebbins, 14o Mass. 339, 5 N. E. 15o (1885) ; Hinds v. Henry,
36 N. J. L. 328 (i73) ; McClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561 (1872) ; Turner v.
Baker, 225 Pa. 359, 74 Atl. 172 (19o9).
' Where no terms are specified and no sale was made the broker must show
the owner's acceptance of the buyer as satisfactory, MECHEM, op. cit. supra note
3, at § 2430, n. 39.
'Roden v. Aldy, 9 La. App. 655, 121 S. 656 (1929) ; Des Rivieres v. Sullivan, 247 Mass. 443, 142 N. E. III (1924).
'Where a sale has been completed it is only necessary that the broker
show that he was the procuring cause, MECHEa, op. cit. supra, note 3, at §
2435 (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 393; note (1923) 26 H.av. L. REv. 875.
'Brackenridge v. Claridge, 91 Tex. 527, 44 S. V. 819 (1898); Aslon v.
Parker Realty Co., 78 Colo. 235, 242 Pac. 45 (1925); NELso.,,, LAW OF REAL
ESTATE BROKERAGE (1928)

198.

" Pfanz v. Hamberg, supra note 6; Gilliland v. Jaynes, 36 Okla. 563, 129

Pac. 8 (1912).

" Gunn v. Bank of California, 99 Cal. 349, 33 Pac. 11o5 (1893) ; Hayden v.

Grillo, 35 Mo. App. 647 (i889) ; Middleton v. Thompson, 163 Pa. 112, 29 At.
796 (1894).

'Pearce, Ability to Pay Entitling Broker to Commission (1927) 31 L.
N. 147.
Contra: Grosse
" Colburn v. Seymour, 32 Colo. 430, 76 Pac. lO58 (1904).
v. Cooley, 43 Minn. 188, 45 N. W. 15 (189o).
' McDermott v. Mahoney, 139 Iowa 292, 115 N. W. 32 (1908) ; McCabe
v. Jones, 141 Wis. 540, 124 N. W. 486 (i91o).
1 For discussion of this restriction and others of a kindred nature, see
Pearce, op. cit. supra note i and cases cited therein.
"Zimmer v. Edinger, 91 Cal. App. 435, 267 Pac. iO (1928) ; Applegate v.
Danciger, 2 S. W. (2d) 635 (Mo. App. 1928); Allsman v. Robinson, 25 S. W.
(2d) 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
mAs in the instant case, at page 504, it is generally said that all the terms
were not agreed on, Flax v. Sovrensky, 262 Mass. 6o, 159 N. E. 497 (1928);
Ebling v. Brewer, 141 At. 363 (Md. 1928).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS-CRPORATIONs-APPLICATION

OF DOMAICILIARY

LAW IN

ORDER To DETERMINE STATUS OF CoRPORATIoN-Complainant a corporation pur-

porting to be incorporated under the laws of Illinois, and owning land in Iowa
sought aid of Iowa courts to restrain the defendant from maintaining a
nuisance which injured the plaintiff's land in Iowa. Defense was that the
plaintiff was not legally incorporated and therefore had no legal existence
which would enable it to maintain a suit. Held, inter alia, that under the laws
of Illinois the organization was at least a de facto corporation and that as such
it could bring this action because a domestic de facto corporation in Iowa could
bring the action. First Title & Securities Co. v. U. S. Gypsiun Co., 233 N. V.
137 (Iowa, i93o).
The legal existence of a de facto corporation cannot be challenged except
by the state and then only in direct proceedings brought for the very purpose.
The amount of compliance with the general incorporation laws that is necessary.
for an organization to acquire the status of a de facto corporation varies with
the jurisdictions.' This problem is further complicated when the corporation
whose existence is challenged claims to be organized under the laws of a jurisdiction other than that in which the question is raised. This was the situation
3
in the instant case. A corporation can exist as such and enjoy the totality of
rights incident to a de lure corporation, only because of the laws of the state
of incorporation,' and whether a de jure corporation has in fact been formed
must be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where incorporation is
claimed.' It therefore follows that whether a sum of rights somewhat less
than those incident to a de jure corporaticn have accrued to an organization
claiming to be a corporation, should also be decided according to the law of
'Arlington Hotel Co. v. Rector, i24 Ark. go, i86 S. W. 622 (1917) ; Grant
Chrome Co. v. Marks, 92 Or. 443, 1II Pac. 345 (i9ig) ; In re Mt. Sharon
Cemetery, 277 Pa. 79, 12o At. 700 (1923) ; note (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 237.
-The general rule is that in order for a de facto corporation to exist the
following requisites are necessary: (I) A charter or general law under which
such corporation as it purports to be might lawfully be organized; (2) A
bona fide attempt to organize thereunder; (3) Actual user of the corporate
franchise. Tulare Irrigation District v. Shepard, 185 U. S. I, 22 Sup. Ct. 531
(Ig0i) ; BALLANTINE,

PRIVATE CORPORATION

(1927)

§ 77.

'A corporation since it arises from a grant of a legal privilege and since
the laws of a state have no extraterritorial force, need not be recognized beycnd
the limits of the state or country under the laws of which it was created, BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra § 285, n. 2. Thus a corporation is only recognized in
states other than where incorporated only on principles of comity, People v.
Alaska S. S. Co., 182 Cal. 202, 187 Pac. 742 (i92o) ; Although foreign corporations are given this right by statute in some states. MISS. ANN. CODE
(Hemingway I927) § 4088.
'BEALE,

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

(I904)

§ 3.

And so a corporation cannot

do acts in foreign states which are not authorized in its charter. Blue Ridge
Power Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., i22 S. C. 222, I15 S. E. 3o6 (I922).
18 TnoiPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 6582; American Water
Works Co. v. Farmers Loan Co., 20 Colo. 203, 37 Pac. 269 (894) ; Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 114 Ky. 892, 72 S. W. 4 (Io3);
Myatt v. Ponca Land & Improvement Co., I4 Okla. I89, 78 Pac. 85 (903).
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This was the
the forum under the law of which incorporation is claimed.
modus operandi employed by the Iowa court who looked to the laws of the

jurisdiction where incorporation was alleged in order to determine the status
of the corporation. The court, following the view adopted by the Restatement
on the Conflict of Laws' held that the corporation would be given the same
8
This
rights in Iowa as would a domestic organization of the same status.
conclusion seems to be in accord with the decided cases.

CONFLIcT OF LAws-PUBLIC POLICY-EFFECr OF PUBLIC POLICY OF THE
FORUM ON FOREIGN CONTRACTs-An action was brought in New York to re-

cover for losses suffered through the negligence of the defendant railway.
Admitting the negligence, the railway claimed to be exempt from such liability
by virtue of a clause in its contract (bill of lading) with the plaintiff shipper,
the contract having been entered into under the British flag and stipulating
that the law of Great Britain should govern. Under that law a clause such as
that relied on was valid and would have been a defense; whereas in New York,

where the suit was brought, a carrier was prohibited by statute from inserting
in a contract any condition "impairing its obligation to exercise due care." '
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover since application of the clause
relied on in defense was contrary to the public policy of New York. By public
policy, said the court, "we mean the law of the state whether found in the constitution, statutes, or judicial records." Strauss & Co., Inc., v. Canadian Pacific
Ry., 173 N. E. 564 (N. Y. 193o).
Public policy is obviously a term susceptible of many varying interpretations, but in view of the numerous judicial attempts to define it, it is not surprising to find that the definition to which the court here had recourse had been
previously enunciated." On the other hand other courts have rejected and even
6

CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. I93O), § 164. "An
association which by the law of the state where it purports to be incorporated
is a 'de facto corporation' will be dealt with in another state as a domestic 'de
facto corporation' is dealt with by the law of that state."
7
1bid.
s It has been suggested that a more accurate result might be reached by
making the purpose of the inquiry the determination of whether the organization could exercise the very power questioned in the jurisdiction where incorporation is claimed. Thus in the instant case the inquiry would not be to the
status of the organization in the state where incorporation was claimed but
whether the very suit in question could have been maintained in that jurisdiction. For a case which seems to adopt this procedure, in the converse situation
i. e. where the association has no rights in the jurisdiction where incorporation
is claimed and is therefore given none in the court of the forum, see Russian
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 24a N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (925).
'CAHIL'S CONSOL LAWS OF

N. Y. ANN.

(I923)

c.

42 § I89.

'Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 127, 197 (1844) ; Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 70 Fed.
2oi, 202 (C. C. A., 8th, 1895) ; Gathright v. Bylles & Co., 154 Ky. io6, 129, 157
S. W. 45 (1913) ; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. I, x2, 5I N. E. 257, 26o (1898).
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criticized this apparent attempt to identify public policy and the law of the
state as mutually co-extensive.'
But it is certainly unwise and perhaps even
futile to discuss abstractly so broad a term as this without reference to a concrete case or class of cases. The instant case is one involving a conflict of laws
problem. What would be the effect of this definition if applied generally ;n
cases of that sort? It is a settled rule of this branch of the law that the
validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where
it is made.' This is subject to the well-established exception that a court will
not enforce a contract even though valid by the law governing it at the time
it was entered into where such enforcement is contrary to the public policy of
the forum? It is generally said that it would require a strong case to bring
this exception into operation,' and to this view the New York Court of Appeals
clearly committed itself in a fairly recent decision.' It seems impossible to
reconcile the language there used' with the words used in the instant case.
' There is a succinct and striking criticism in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago
& St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio 64, 115 N. E. 505 (1916) by Wanamaker, J., at p. 68, u15 N. E. at 507:
"It has frequently been said that such public policy is a composite of
constitutional provisions, statutes, and judicial decisions, and some courts
have gone so far as to hold it is limited to these. The obvious fallacy of
such a conclusion is quite apparent from the most superficial examination.
When a contract is contrary to some provision of the Constitution, we say
it is prohibited by the Constitution, and not by public policy. When a contract is contrary to a statute we say that it is prohibited by a statute, and
not by public policy. When a contract is contrary to a settled line of judicial
decisions, we say it is prohibited by the law of the land, but we do not say
it is contrary to public policy. Public policy is the cornerstone-the
foundation-of all Constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions; and its
latitude and longitude, its height and depth, greater than any or all of
them."
'Chamblee v. J. B. Colt Co., 31 Ga. App. 34, 119 S. E. 438 (1923) ; Pope
v. Hanke, 155 Ill. 617, 4o N. E. 839 (1894) ; Klein v. Keeler, 42 Okla. 592, 141
Pac. 1117 (1897).
There is also authority to the effect that the law of the
place of performance or the law intended by the parties governs. Beale, Vhat
Law Governs the Validity of a Contract? (1909) 23 HARv. LAW REv. i. But
the principle of lex loci contractus seems to be best, and was the view adopted
by the court in the principal case.
' Chicago & N. Co. v. Gardner, 51 Neb. 70, 70 N. W. 5o8 (1897) ; Bartlett
v. Collins, 109 Wisc. 477, 85 N. W. 703 (19O). For a collection of cases and
discussion, see Lawson, Enforcement of Contract Valid Where Made But Contrary to the Public Policy of the State of the Forum (1902) 54 CENT. LAW
JOURN. 223.
6 GOODRIcH, CoNxucT OF LAWS (1927)
215, 217; Beach, Enforcemenzt of
Vested Rights (I918), 27 YALE L. J.663 ct seq.
ILoucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (1918) (a tort
case).
'Cardozo, J. said: "Our own scheme of legislation may be different
That is not enough to show that public policy forbids us to enforce the foreign
right." "Courts are not free to refvse to enforce a right at pleasure. They
do not close their doors unless help would violate some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deeD-rooted tradition
of the common weal." "The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that
rights lawfully vested should everywhere be maintained."

RECENT CASES
It would seem that the strict literal application of the definition of public policy
announced in the latter case would of itself be sufficient to abrogate completely
the fundamental conflict of laws rule, by bringing every case within the exception to it. In all conflict of laws cases, it is obvious that there must be two
conflicting rules of law, that of the foreign state and that of the forum. The
rule of the foreign state is to be applied by the forum unless the public policy
of the state of the forum is violated. But if the public policy of the state of
the forum is conceived to be identical with its law there would never be occasion. to resort to the law of the foreign state, for by hypothesis the law of the
foreign state is contrary to the law of the forum; it is therefore contrary to
the public policy of the forum, and the situation is that in which the forum
will refuse to apply the foreign law. This would of course be a startling departure from the accepted rules outlined above, and it is quite inconceivable
that the New York court in the case under discussion meant it as such. The
case must rather be regarded as another illustration of the danger which lies in
the use of a ready-made formula, designed to serve in one field of law, in
another field for which it was never intended and to which it is not applicable
The court could readily have reached the same result by the application of a
broader and more reasonable concept of public policy,0 and the decision could
scarcely have been criticized. In such a situation it is indeed unfortunate that
they found it necessary to use the definition of public policy found in the
opinion.

CONTRACrS-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-EFFECT OF MAIL DELAY IN DELIVERY OF OFFER ON SPECIFIED PERIOD FOR AccEPTANcE-Defendant, by letter
dated January 29, made an offer to plaintiff for an exchange of farms. The
letter stated, inter alia, "I will give you eight days to either accept or reject
this offer." The plaintiff did not receive this letter until February 2, although
plaintiff and defendant reside in nearby counties of the same state. On February 8, six days after plaintiff had received the letter and eleven days after
defendant had written, plaintiff wired an acceptance. Defendant refused to
comply with the terms of the offer on the grounds that the plaintiff had not
accepted within the eight days. Plaintiff brings a bill for specific performance.
Held, that the acceptance by wire created a contract, and that the bill for
specific performance would lie. CaIdwell v. Cline, i56 S. E. 55 (W. Va. i930).
In the situation, as in the instant case, where an offer and an acceptance
thereto are effected by means of post or telegraphic communications, certain

'Vidal v. Girard's Executors, supra note 2 (founding of college in accordance with Girard's will) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chic. M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
supra note 2 (validity of contract in state where made) ; Gathright v. Bylles &
Co., supra note 2 (validity of municipal ordinance) ; People v. Hawkins, sapra
note 2 (validity of criminal statute).
"0This has been done by other cases: Chicago & N. Co. v. Gardner, supra
note 5. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chic., Mil., & St. P. Ry. Co., supra
note 2, where enforcement of such clause was refused because (p. 208) "such
contract attempts to release the carrier from discharge of essential duties imposed on it by law, and . . . the parties to the contract are not on an equal
footing."
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elementary principles have developed. Thus, for purposes of acceptance, an
offer does not exist until received by the offeree.' If the offeror names a
specified period for the continuance of the offer, the offeree can accept only
If the delivery of the offer is delayed after having been
during this period
dispatched by the offeror, and the offeree on receipt of the offer knows or
should know that there has been a delay, the acceptance must be within that
time which would have been the limit had the offer been eceived on time.'
These principles are fundamental in the law of contracts, but they cannot be
applied without reference to the intention of the parties as manifested by the
terms of the offer and the acceptance thereto. The court in the instant case
summarily dismissed the problem presented on the ground that an offer is completed only when received by the offeree, and that as the offeree did not receive
the letter until February 2, his acceptance on February 8 was within the
specified eight days. This result seems to be based on the assumption that the
offeror did not intend the eight days in question to begin to run until the
offeree had actually received the letter. That this interpretation is unreasonable
may easily be seen by carrying it to its logical conclusion, e. g.. if the letter had
been delayed two or three months, or any length of time, in the mail, the offeree
could still have accepted within eight days after receiving it-an obviously
absurd result, yet a necessary one under the court's construction of the letter.
A less unreasonable interpretation would be that the eight days were to run
from the date of the letter. Before the court could have adopted this interpretation, however, it would have had to consider other factors, such as actual time
necessary for delivery of the letter in proportion to the time given for acceptance,' true date of the letter in case of a misdating, and promptness in mailing
letter by the offeror. ' It seems that the most reasonable construction would be
that the specified time was to run from the date the offeree should have received the letter had it been delivered in due course of post. Under this
'The Palo Alto, 2 WXare 343 (D. C. Me. 1847) ; Bennett v. Cosgriff, 38
L. T. (N. s.) 177, 178 (1878), "A letter is a continuing offer, or order, or
statement by the sender, which takes effect in the place where the person to
whom it is sent receives it."; I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 34; CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) § 53; see Tinn v. Hoffman & Co., 29 L. T.
(N. S.) 157 (1873).
-'Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394, 12 Sup. Ct. 646 (1892) ; Miller v.
Sharpe, 52 Ind. App. ii, 10 N. E. io8 (1912) ; I WILLISTON, Op. Cit. SUpra
§ 53; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) § 40.
3 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 63; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
1930) § 51 ; see Adams v. Lindsell, I B. & AId. 68i (i8M8).
Thus if an offer was made which specified a week as a limit for an acceptance, and the parties lived at such distance that it would ordinarily take
more than a week for a letter to be delivered from the offeror to the offeree, a
reasonable interpretation of the offer would certainly not be that the week was
to run from tile time tile letter was written, because under such an interpretation the offer would never come into existence for the purpose of acceptance
by the offeree.
'For example, suppose in the instant case the offeror had, through neglect,
or purposely, not mailed the letter until February I. It does not seem that a
reasonable interpretation of the letter would be that the eight days were running
all the time the offeror was carrying the letter around in his pocket.
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interpretation the offeror would be adequately protected from any delay in the
mail, and the offeree would still have all the privileges and powers which a
reasonable interpretation of the offer would give him.'

CONTEMPORANEOUS ORAL
CONTRACrs-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AGENT'S
PROMISE OF P0RFORMANcE-Plaintiff contracted to purchase a carload of grapes
through defendant as agent of the vendor. The terms of the contract were not
carried out and plaintiff seeks recovery on defendant's oral promise that the
contract would be accurately fulfilled. Held, that the test of whether such
promise was within the Statute of Frauds was not whether a beneficial consideration moved to the defendant, but whether the oral promise was a primary
undertaking or merely collateral. Bartolottal v. Calvo, 152 MI. 3o6 (Conn.
1930).
From the mass of decisions on the Statute of Frauds a number of tests'
have been evolved in an effort to determine when a given promise is to answer
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another within the contemplation of the
statute and hence subject to the requirement that it be in writing.'- Some of
these tests are concerned principally with the nature of the. promise' while
others look chiefly to the motive of the promisor.' The most frequently used
test, however, is that which makes the validity of the oral promise depend on
whether a beneficial consideration moves to its maker.' It is this last test which
the principal case vigorously rejects and in so doing reaches a conclusion consistent with the well-established principle that an absolute independent liability
0
Unmay be assumed by one to whom no consideration whatsoever moves
fortunately, however, the test offered as a substitute is much too generic to be
workable. The only reason which the court advances in support, namely, that
the character and not the circumstances of the promise should govern, seems to
beg the question. The utility of a test is to guide the jury in its construction
of the character of the promise. From such construction the legal conclusion
'Under this interpretation it would, of course, become necessary to inquire
whether or not the offeree knew or should have known of the delay. As the
facts of the instant case show no evidence on this point it is impossible to say
what the result would have been had the court adopted this interpretation of the
offeree's letter.

1 WIUSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 462.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, § 4, Clause 2.

3

Koban v. Gordon Supply Co., 253 Ill. App. 569 (1929); Missouri State
Life Ins. Co. v. Early, 222 Mo. App. 1118, 13 S. W. (2d) 1097 (1929) ; Newkumet v. Meyer, 138 Okla. 136, 28o Pac. 579 (1929).
"Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58 (I89i); Texas Co. v.
Seaboard National Bank, 26 Ohio App. 104, 159 N. E. 842 (1926) ; Bayard v.
Penna. Knitting Mills Corp., 29o Pa. 79, 137 Atl. gio (1927).
rNational Surety Co. of New York v. Jackson County Bank, 20 F. (2d)
644 (C. C. A., 4 th, 1927) ; White v. Rentoul, io8 N. Y. 222, 15 N. E. 318 (888) ;
Schroyer v. Wally, 96 Pa. Super. 234 (1929) ; CONTRACrS RESTATEMENT (Am.
L. Inst. 1928) §§ 175, 178.
0 Downs v. Perkins, 207 Mass. 409, 93 N. E. 645 (1911); Drover's Deposit
National Bank v. Tichenor, 156 Wis. 251, 145 N. W. 777 (1914).
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is drawn as to whether the liability assumed is primary or collateral. While
probably no flawless test will ever appear, a leading text-writer's suggestion,'
that an oral promise is within the statute if to the actual or presumed knowledge
of the promisee the relation of the oral promisor to the other obligor was that
of surety, seems to underlie many decisions,' including the instant case. This
9
view would effectuate the purpose of the Statute, which was to prevent persons being held as oral sureties and would, as well, respect the intention of the
parties. In the surprisingly few cases, in which an agent's contemporaneous
;
oral promise of performance has been made the basis of a claim against him,'
the substance of this last test, though otherwise expressed, is especially noticeable as the criterion of the character of the promise. No apparent reason,
however, removes this class of cases from the principles applicable to oral
promises in general.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-TRIAL BY JURY FOR REcK-

LESS DRIVING-A motorist was charged with having driven an automobile at a

prohibited rate of speed and recklessly so as to endanger property and individuals, in violation of the District of Columbia Traffic Act. The maximum
He
penalty was a fine of one hundred dollars or imprisonment of thirty days
pleaded not guilty and demanded a trial by jury. From a summary conviction
the defendant appealed. Held, that the accused had a right to a trial by jury
under the Federal Constitution. District of Columbia v. Colts, 51 Sup. Ct. 52
(U. S. 1930).
The United States Supreme Court has decided that the provision of the
Federal Constitution that "the trial of ail crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury",2 must be read in the light of the common law,' according to which the class of offenses denominated as "petty" were summarily
1 lViiLuisTo, op. cit. supra note 1,§ 475.
' Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N. Y. 497, 121 N. E. 362 (i918) ; McMillan v. Dickover, 119 Ore. 116, 248 Pac. i54 (1926); Bayard v. Penna.
Knitting Mills Corp., supra note 4; Todd v. Victory, 277 S. XV. 705 (Tex.,
7

1925).

'Davis v. Patrick, supra note
"0Hazeltine v. Wilson, 55 N.
Colahan, 267 Pa. 102, 11o AtI. 246
406 (Tex. i916), aff'd, 199 S. W.

4; I WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note I, § 452.
J. L. 250, 26 Atl. 79 (893) ; Lieberman v.
(I92O) ; Dallin Fruit Co. v. Neely, 182 S. W.
827 (917).

'"(b) No individual shall operate a motor vehicle over a public highway
in the District (I) recklessly; or (2) at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper . . . or (3) so as to endanger any property or individual;
S. . ". D. C. CODE (1930) tit. 6, c 9, § 246.
U. S. CONST., Art. III.§ 2, cl. 3.
'Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301 (i888) ; Schick v. United
States, 195 U. S. 65, 24 Sup. Ct. 826 (1904); see for exhaustive discussion
from the historical point of view, Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the Costitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury (1926) 39 HARV. L.
REv. 917.
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triable without a jury. Although it is clear that a jury trial will be denied, if
the offense may be classified as "petty," there is still the problem of what constitutes "pettiness." This precise question was first considered by the Federal
Supreme Court in the case of Callan v. lVilsonn where it was held that the
offense of conspiracy, punishable by a fine of $25 or imprisonment for thirty
days, was not within the category of petty offenses, it being "an offense of a
grave character, affecting the public at large." In the more recent case of
Schick v. United States it was held that (x) the nature of the offense and
(2)
the severity of its punishment must be considered in determining the
classification of offenses as either petty or serious. Such tests, without more,
accomplish little in the way of fixing a definite line of demarcation between the
two classes of offenses 0 Lower federal courts, following this decision, have
recognized the importance of considering the penalty for the ptirpose of classifying the offense,' and one court has held that an offense which may be punishable
by a fine of $iooo and imprisonment for a year cannot be tried otherwise than
by a jury.8 However, the court in the principal case, has failed, at least in the
opinion, to consider the element of punishment in arriving at its conclusion
that jury trial is guaranteed to persons charged with reckless driving. It must
be conceded that the holding, which apparently determines the question of pettiness by the test of the nature of the offense alone, has failed to consider an
important element.' To say that an offense is a serious one requiring a jury
trial, because it is ati"act of such obvious depravity that to characterize it as
petty would be to shock the general moral sense", 0 is to furnish but little
information for future guidance, since such a mode of determining procedure
is undoubtedly based uporn individual judgment rather than upon any established
'Supra note 3.
'Su pra note 3, at 68, 24 Sup. Ct. at 827.
'True the majority of the court in the Schick Case intimate that offenses
entailing a fine of not less than $Iooo nor more than $5000, and imprisonment
for not less than six months nor more that three years "obviously . . . must
be classed among the serious criminal offenses"' but it is not certain that
offenses entailing penalties but little short of $iooo fine or six months' imprisonment must be classified as petty.
'United States v. Praeger, 149 Fed. 474 (W. D. Tex. 19o7) ($5oo fine or
six months' imprisonment or both for refusal to testify before military tribunal
-petty) ; Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 6th, I9O9) (possible
penalties of two years' imprisonment and $5oo fine for violation of excise lawsnot petty) ; Frank v. United States, 192 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911) ($200
penalty for misbranding food product-petty); Coates v. United States, 290
Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) (penalty of $iooo fine and twelve months' imprisonment for violation of prohibition act-not petty).
' Coates v. United States, supra note 7.
' See Frankfurter and Corcoran, op. cit. supra note 3, at 981 ("Nor can we
escape differentiation between severity of sentences and relative lightness")
Note (1922) 70 U. OF P. L. Ray. 318-320.
'Sutherland, J., in principal case, at 56.
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formula.' The additional fact that the offense charged was indictable at common law as a nuisance' was found to support the conclusion of the court in
the instant case," but such a test could be of little value in considering newly
created offenses for which no direct analogies could be found at common law.
The question naturally arises as to whether the Federal Supreme Court has
abandoned the penalty test. If, however, the instant case is authority for the
proposition that the Federal Constitution guarantees trial by jury of offenses
'
with a maximum penalty of $ioo or thirty days' imprisonment, it seems that
it was denied
where
jury trial will have to be granted in a broad class of cases
previously because the penalty was not sufficiently severe.' Especially would
such a holding be of importance in view of the pending Congressional legislation" designed to make offenses, which are punishable by 5oo fine or six
months' imprisonment, triable summarily before United States Commissioners,
and the recently enacted amendment to the National Prohibition Act" decreasing the penalty for trivial violations to a fine of $5oo or six months in jail, or
both. It is interesting to note that the holding of the Court of Appeals of the
8
District of Columbia,' affirmed in the principal case, was cited during the Congressional debates" as proof of the unconstitutionality of the pending bill.

EVIDENCE-IDENTIFICATION

By FINGERPRINTS AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR CON-

VIcTION-Defendant was convicted of an attempt to commit burglary. The
evidence against him consisted solely of a fingerprint found on a piece of glass
which had been broken in order to gain entrance to the house where the crime
took place. A police expert testified that the fingerprint on the glass was
identical with the fingerprint of the defendant Defendant moved for a new
trial on the ground that the uncorroborated evidence of the fingerprint was
insufficient to warrant the jury's verdict of guilty. Held, that the evidence
" It has been said that the determination of whether an act constitutes a
minor offense or whether it falls within the category of serious ones has remained largely a question of historical fact to be determined empirically.
PROFATT, JURY TRIAL (1877) § 87; Frankfurter and Corcoran, op. cit. vupra
note 3, at 921, 978.
" The test of indictability as a determinant of the validity of summary
procedure was first laid down in State v. Anderson, 4o N. J. L. 224 (1878),
State v. Rodgers, 91 N. j. L. 212, IO2 At. 433 (1917), and the latter case was
cited by the court in the principal case.
"Principal case, at 56.
', "(c) Any individual violating any provision of this section where the
offense constitutes reckless driving shall . . . be fined not less than $25 nor
more than $Ioo or imprisoned not less than ten days nor more than thirty days",
principal case, at 55.
"Cf. cases supra note 7, especially United States v. Praeger, where the
court expressed a doubt as to the constitutionality of summary trial.
"H. R. 9937 (pending in the Senate, having passed the House).
"U. S. Daily, Jan. I6, 1931, at 3475.
"Colts v. District of Columbia, 38 F. (2d) 535 (Ct of App. D. C. 193o).
" 72 CONG. REC. oo61 ; see statement, at 1062, to the effect that the proposed bill applies to all petty offenses.
It has been argued that summary trials may be unconstitutional depending
upon the pecuniary interest of the judge or magistrate, WILLIs, Are Justice of
the Peace Courts Impartial? (1928) 3 IND. L. J. 654.
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justified the verdict. Commonwealth v. Albright, decided in the Court of Oyer
& Terminer, Dauphin County, Pa. (opinion filed Dec. 22, 193o).
This case is of particular interest since it appears to be the first case decided in this country in which a conviction on uncorroborated fingerprint evidence has been upheld. It is well settled that fingerprints are admissible in
evidence as proof of identity, and that the testimony of qualifiel experts may be
introduced to show the correspondence between the fingerprints of the accused
and those found at the scene of a crime The weight of such testimony is for
the jury. The decisions show that juries, acting upon the assumption that the
fingerprints of any individual are unique and unchanged throughout life, accord
great weight to such testimony.
The truth of this assumption is generally
conceded, although the study of fingerprints is of comparatively recent origin,"
and although the fingerprints of the vast majority of our population have never
been examined and compared. Nevertheless, the value of fingerprints as evidence
should not be over-emphasized. In the first place, it should be borne in mind
that the fingerprint expert is generally a police official who is usually working
to obtain a conviction. Secondly, fingerprints inadvertently made are never
perfect, and may often be so imperfect as to make accurate identification impossible. Thirdly, there is the possibility of forging fingerprints.' Fourthly,
there is the possibility in the situation where the fingerprint is found ol a
portable object, that the object which is found at the scene of a crime was left
there by someone other than the person whose fingerprint it is. And finally,
even though the fingerprint is gentine, and is left at the scene of the crime by
the person whose fingerprint corresponds with it, it may have been made before
or after the actual commission of the crime.0 Therefore, while convictions
based solely on fingerprint evidence have been upheld in England and Austria,'
it would seem that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt is preferable, especially
where the defendant presents some evidence, however slight, of his innocence.
Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 Pac. 288 (i92i) ; People v. Jennings, 252Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077 (1911) ; State v. Cerciello, 86 N. J. L. 3o9, 9o Atl. 1112
(1914) ; People v. Roach, 215 N. Y. 592, iog N. E. 618 (1915).
' Cases cited in note I supra.
2 Moon v. State, supra note I (evidence consisted of a single clear fingerprint and a tiny piece of skin) ; Castleton's case, 3 Crim. App. 74 (Eng. I9O9)
(evidence consisted solely of a fingerprint found on a candle) ; Parker v. Rex,
14 Corn. L. Rep. 68i (Austr. 1912) (evidence consisted solely of a fingerprint
found on a bottle). In all these cases the jury brought a verdict of guilty.
' The study of fingerprints is generally stated to have been begun by Sir
Francis Galton in i888. For a concise history of fingerprints, see UNDERILL,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1923) § 811.
I There seems to be no doubt that fingerprints can be forged, although the
courts have either ignored the possibility, or have emphatically declared that
such forgery was impossible. Thus, in Parker v. Rex, supra note 3 at page
683, the court said, "A fingerprint is therefore in reality an unforgeable signature". To the effect that fingerprints can be forged, see Carlson, Finger Prints
Can Be Forged, (1920) 5 Va. L. Reg. 765. The method of making such forgeries is explained in WEIIDE & BEFFEL, FINGER PRINTS CAN BE FORGED (1926).
'In McGary v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 597, 200 S. W. 527 (1918) where the
facts were almost identical with those in the principal case, the court set aside
the conviction because of this possibility.
I Castleton's Case, supra note 3; Parker v. Rex, supra note 3.
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LAW-IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY FROM EXECUAGAINST IT-The Swedish Government,'
having entered into a contract with the plaintiff to purchase coal for the operation of its railways, sued in the District Court of New York for breach of
the contract. Plaintiff counterclaimed, alleging a breach on the part of the
Swedish Government, and obtained an affirmative judgment.' An attachment
order issued against certain property of the Swedish Government, whereupon
the Swedish Minister filed a plea of immunity, and moved to dissolve the attachment. Held, that submission by the Swedish Government to the jurisdiction of the court, and consent to being sued therein, is not consent to an attachment of its property. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen,
43 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o).
The question whether foreign states are immune from process in the
American courts when engaged in commercial or industrial activity, was answered in the affirmative by the United States Supreme Court in Beriz.i Bres.
3
v. S. S. Pesaro. The problem before the court in the principal case may be
stated thus: Does a foreign state, engaging in commercial activity, have a right
successfully to plead immunity from execution, after having permitted itself
to be sued in our courts? In other words, the court was called upon to do more
4
than to affirm the Pesaro decision, so that it could easily have arrived at a
different conclusion had it had the slightest inclination to limit the application
INTERNATIONAL

TION ON A VALID JUDGMENT ENTERED

'The Swedish Government represented its Railway Administration to be
a private corporation, and it was this corporation which entered into the contract. All parties concerned in the case admit that the Swedish Government is
the real party in interest. No plea of immunity was properly filed until the
present attachment proceedings, although the question was indirectly raised at
several stages of the litigation.
2 The ordinary rule of international law is that a sovereignty, by suing in
a foreign court, impliedly consents to such counterclaims, and set-offs arising
out of the same transaction, as are defensive in character, and not to the extent
of being liable on an affirmative cross-suit, French Republic v. Inland Navigation Co., 263 Fed. 410 (E. D. Mo. 192o). In the instant case, however, the
Swedish Government contested the merits of the counterclaim until judgment
was rendered against it, and in such a case there is a waiver of immunity and
a consent to the exercise of jurisdiction, see principal case, at 707, citing Porto
Rico v. Ramos, 232 U. S. 627, 34 Sup. Ct. 461 (1914).
1271 U. S. 562, 46 Sup. Ct. 611 (1926). This decision set at rest the controversy that existed in the Federal Courts. In the lower court, Judge Mack,
after an exhaustive examination of the authorities, both American and foreign,
came to the opposite conclusion, 277 Fed. 473 (D. C. N. Y., 1921) ; see (1926)
40 HARv. L. REv. 126. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the Supreme
Court, disposed of the problem in the following manner: "WVe think the principles are applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government for a
public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of its
people or providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans and
operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same sense
that war ships are. We know of no international usage which regards the
maintenance and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time of
peace as any less a public purpose than the maintenance and training of a naval
force", at 574, 46 Sup. Ct. at 612.
'The Swedish Government had misrepresented the true situation, and had
already consented to being sued. Under such circumstances, the court might
very readily have rejected the plea of immunity.
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of the principle of the Pesaro case. That consent to be sued is not necessarily
consent to a seizure of property, is a rule well settled in international law.'
However, the court was not bound to apply the rule to the instant case, so that
the decision can be looked upon as more firmly implanting the Pesaro decision
in our law. The wisdom of thus extending sovereign immunity is to he
The principles of international jurisprudence applicable here crysdoubted
tallized at a time when the social and economic status of the various states was
far different from that of today. The increasing tendency on the part of sovereignties to engage in commercial and industrial pursuits ' calls for the application of new principles of law. Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lea. Sovereign governments, When engaged in enterprises not necessary for the carrying
out of their sovereign duties, should be placed on the same footing as private
entrepreneurs. It is admitted that there are many difficulties inherent in such
an attitude; the question of what is public and what is private enterprise is
not easy to answer. The dividing line is hard to draw. But this way out of
the dilemma seems the preferable one. Whether this result should be accomplished by domestic legislation, by international agreement, or by judicial decision, is another problem. 8

LANDLORD AND

TENANT-LANDLORD'S

COVENANT TO

REBUILD

PREMISES

DESTROYED BY FIRE-EFFECT OF CITY ORDINANCE FORBIDDING ISSUANCE OF
PERMIT FOR RESTORING ORIGINAL PREMISEs-Landlord covenanted to rebuild
premises if rendered unfit for occupancy by fire. The building was then partially destroyed by fire, but due to a subsequent city building code, the landlord
was refused a permit by the city to restore the original building. The landlord
thereupon erected a new building, and rented it to third parties. Held, that
the refusal by the city of his application for permit to repair or to rebuild the
damaged premises relieved the landlord of liability on the covenant to rebuild,
and terminated the lease. Poledore v. Mayerfield, 173 N. E. 2,92 (Ind. 1930).
"Duff Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Gov't of Kelantan, [1924] A. C. 797; Von Hellfeld
v. Imperial Russian Gov't, Zeitschrift fuer Internationales Recht X X [19io]
416 (translation in (1911) 5 AMi. J. INT. LAw 490). See French Republic v.
Inland Navigation Co., supra note 2 at 412: "It is, of course, apparent that an
insuperable difficulty, perhaps even an utter impossibility, will inevitably be met
in enforcing the payment of any judgment which might be obtained upon the
counterclaim against the defendant herein . . . it may be conceded that a
judgment against the Republic of France in favor of defendant upon its counterclaim could never be collected, save with the consent of France."
" See Hervey, The Imnnunity of Foreign States When Engaged In Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution, (1929) 27 MIcn. L. REV. 751.
7"The problem of obtaining proper redress for damage caused by the
commercial or industrial activity of states has become increasingly acute by
reason of the general extension of governmental activities, and the tendency
to nationalize certain industries. The operation by the state of public services
such as the railroads, shipping, the telegraph and the telephone, and the conduct
of public monopolies such as those of tobacco, coffee, liquor and salt, bring the
state into numerous relations of a private legal nature with its subjects and
with the subjects of other states", Kuhn, Competence of the Courts in Regard
to Foreign States, (1927) 21 Am. J. INT. LAw 742.
8 See Herney, loc. cit. supra note 6.
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It is generally conceded that when a building, rather than the land on
which it is erected, is the essential subject matter of a lease, as seems to be the
situation in the instant case, the destruction of the building terminates the lease,'
unless, of course, the parties have contracted otherwise. In the instant case,
the termination of the lease was prevented by the express agreement of the
landlord to rebuild. The tenant, by reason of the continued existence of the
lease, must have retained the right either to occupy the premises in the unrepaired state, or to occupy the new building erected by the landlord in fulfillment of his covenant to rebuild. Therefore, since the existence of the lease
does not depend on the state of repair of the premises,' the landlord's defense
of impossibility of restoration, regardless of the merits of impossibility of performance as a defense, could in no way be a defense to the averment of the
eviction, but must relate solely to the question of breach of covenant. If t!.e
landlord has refused to erect new premises, his defense, though sufficient under
the instant case, should not be good. This is so, though an often quoted case'
holds that a city ordinance prohibiting erection of wooden buildings, made a
covenant to rebuild impossible of performance and was a good defense to an
action for breach of covenant where the building leased was of wood. However, there is nothing to prevent a rebuilding of the premises with materials
permitted by the ordinance. It is agreed that such performance of the covenant
would be more difficult and expensive, but the fact that performance of a
contract has become more difficult than was originally contemplated by the
parties, does not excuse any of them' Courts following such an interpretation
have upheld the covenant to rebuild in favor of the tenant.' Both of the extremes, however, are harsh, and a medium should be reached, as was done in
'McMillen v. Solomon, 42 Ala. 356 (i868)

(apartments in house) ; Ains-

worth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89 (1869) (half of a building);

2 TAYLOR,

LANDLORD

(9th ed. I9O4) § 52o. In the instant case, the building in question
was a stoie. This fact points to the conclusion that the building, and not the
underlying land, was the important subject matter of the lease.
'BURDICK, REAL PROPI:RTY (1914) 222, "The parties may of course stipulate what effect, if any, the destruction, or the injury shall have upon the lease."
A covenant to rebuild must have been made in contemplation of the continuance
of the lease, in spite of injury.
'McCardell v Williams, ig R. I. 701, 36 Atl. 719 (1897) holds that a
tenant may occupy premises in an unrepaired state where the landlord breaches
his covenant to repair, and recoup damages in an action for rent. Since this
right to occupy rises from the lease, fact of performance of the covenant, does
not affect that right to occupy what is on the land.
'Cordes v. Miller, 39 Mich. 58I (1878). The landlord in the principal
case depended on this case as support for his contention that the lease terminated. However, since the action was for breach of covenant, the decision
can only be used as authority in such litigation.
53 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1963, "The fact that a promise is
made more difficult and expensive . . . than the parties anticipated when the
contract was made, will not ordinarily excuse the promissor."
'David v. Ryan, 47 Iowa 642 (1878). In this case, the covenantor was
the tenant. However, once such a covenant to rebuild is entered into, there is
no reason why it should not be as binding in its effects on a lessor as on a
lessee. Fire Association v. Rosenthal, io8 Pa. 474, i Atl. 3o3 (1885) ; Williams
v. Tyas, 4 Grant Ch. 533 (Upper Canada 1854).
AND TENANT
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one Canadian case The covenant should be enforced, with remedies to the
tenant for breach of covenant. If the landlord does rebuild, the tenant should
be allowed to occupy the premises, but it should remain in the power of the
court to adjust the rent. In the instant case, however, there was no breach of
covenant to rebuild, as it was performed by the erection of the building that
was acceptable to the city authorities. The tenant should have had a right to
occupy the building, and the deprivation by the landlord of that right should
have been held to constitute an eviction.8

MORTGAGES-PRIORITY OF MORTGAGE FOR FUTURE ADVANCES OvER SuBSEQUENT ENCUMBRANCES IF MORTGAGE ALONE Is RECORDED---A bond and mort-

gage for $2oo was exchanged for the oral agreemefit of the mortgagee to
allow the mortgagor a standing credit of $2000. After the mortgage was
recorded, a judgment lien was entered against the mortgaged premises. Thereafter the mortgagor made payments to the mortgagee equal to the credits extended by the latter prior to entry of the judgment lien, but owing to fresh
advances of credit the mortgage dbt was never extinguished. Held, that the
mortgagee was entitled to priority over the judgment lien holder in the proceeds
of the premises when sold. lWardinman v. Iseman, Appeal of hfantz-Wright Co.,
99 Pa. Super. 551 (1930).

A recorded mortgage in order to operate as notice to a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer must sufficiently identify the debt secured by it. In
the present case all that appeared on the record was a bond and mortgage for
$2ooo, which, since they bore no date of maturity, were, by presumption, due
immediately.' That the bond and mortgage were merely securities for such
credits as the mortgagor might reqtire the mortgagee to advance under his
oral contract could not be discovered from the record. Despite this misdescription the court's holding, that the recordation was sufficient to give the mortgagee a lien as against future encumbrances, seems sound and accords with
the weight of authority.' Since the judgment lien holder has notice of the
Williams v. Tyas, supra note 6.
eviction occurs when the landlord does something to deprive, and
does deprive the tenant of the use of the demised premises or some part
thereof." I TAYLOR, op. cit. slpra note I, at § 3o9.
8"An

IGardner v. Cohn, 191 Ill. 553, 61 N. E. 492 (igoi) ; Bowen v. Ratcliff,
140 Ind. 393, 39 N. E. 86o (1895).
'Rhoads v. Reed, 89 Pa. 436 (1879) ; I JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)

§ 93.
'Hance Hardware Co. v. Denbigh Hall Inc., 152 AtI. 130 (Del. 193o);
Platt v. Griffith, 27 N. J. Eq. 207 (1876) ; Land Title & Trust Co. v. ShoeIt is sufficient if the mortgage states
maker, 257 Pa. 213, ioi At. 335 (917).
either the limit which it is to secure or the fact that it is to cover future advances, Tapia v. Denartini, 77 Cal. 383, I9 Pac. 641 (1888) ; I JoNEs, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, § 45o. The stricter rule of North v. Belden, 13 Conn- 376 (1840)
requiring the real nature of the transaction as a mortgage for future advances
to be indicated by the record is approved, however, in 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISDICTION (4th ed. 1919) § 1197, IL 2.
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existence of the mortgage and of the maximum sum secured by it, he suffers
no injury by supposing that it secured a present debt of $2ooo instead of a
future debt of possibly less amount.' A new difficulty, however, arises in
considering the effect of the mortgagor's payments after the judgment lien
attached. By the weight of American authority a mortgage for future advances becomes, as to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers, an effective
lien, for all advances actually made, from the time of recording rather than
from the time when each advance is made, although limited i, many states to
cases where the making of the advances is obligatory upon the mortgagee.'
While in the present case the advances were obligatory, yet the recording was
misleading in making it appear that the debt secured was a present debt for a
fixed sum which would be diminished by the mortgagor's payments. Consequently, it would seem that if the judgment lien holder had knowledge of the
payments, and had no reason to suppose that they were on account of any
other obligation, and if the mortgagee had notice of the judgment lien-and in
Pennsylvania entry of the lien would be constructive notice to him,--the priority
of the mortgage should be reduced to the extent of the payments received by
the mortgagee subsequent to entry of the judgment lien. Otherwise the judgment lien holder might be regarded as suffering injury through supposing that

'Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (0876) ; Moroney's Appeal, 24 Pa.
372 (1855). Non-disclosure of the fact that the mortgage is to secure future
advances has been termed a "suspicious circumstance" justifying a searching
scrutiny of the transaction to determine if there was not an actual intent to
defraud creditors thereby, Holt v. Creamer, 34 N. J. Eq. I81 (188i).
' Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Winward, 47 Idaho 485, 276 Pac. 971 (1929);
Brinkmeyer v. Helbling, 57 Ind. 435 (1877) ; Micele v. Falduti, iol N. J. Eq.
103, 137 Ati. 92 (1927).
This rule has been applied where the advances were
not obligatory, but were necessary to prevent the mortgagee suffering loss
through bankruptcy of the mortgagor, Rowan v. Sharps' Rifle Mfg. Co., 29
Conn. 282 (186o). So also, where the mortgagee might have refused to perform his agreement to make advances because of nonperformance of a condition
precedent by the mortgagor, Landers-Morrison-Christenson Co. v. Ambassador
Holding Co., 171 Minn. 445, 214 N. W. 503 (0927). But where the advances
are voluntary, the mortgagee not being obligated to make them, most jurisdictions hold that they relate in lien only to the date of the advancement instead
of the date of the mortgage and are subject to all intervening encumbrances
of which the mortgagee has notice when making the advancement, Gray v.
McClellan, 214 Mass. 92, loo N. E. io93 (1913) ; Bank of Montgomery County's
Appeal, 36 Pa. 17o (i86O).
' In Pennsylvania recording of a second encumbrance on the premises is
constructive notice, as respects advances thereafter made by the prior encumbrancer, and such advances will not take priority over the second lien unless
their making was obligatory on the encumbrancer, Ter-Hoven v. Kerns, 2 Pa.
96 (1846) ; see Note (1914) 62 U. oF PA. L. REv. 556. In most jurisdictions,
however, actual notice of a subsequent encumbrance must lie given a prior
encumbrancer; recording is notice to subsequent encumbrancers only, Shiras v.
Caig, 7 Cranch 34 (U. S. 1812) ; Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43 (1881);
I JONES, 'MORTGAGES § 456.
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the mortgage debt had been reduced or extinguished,' whereas the purpose of
the recording acts is to protect purchasers and lien holders from secret encumbrances and agreements affecting the land. This aspect of the present case,
however, was not considered in the court's opinion, though facts not reported
may have excluded its pertinency.

PARENT AND CHILD-TORTS-PARENT SUING MINOR CHILD-The plaintiff,
a passenger in an automobile driven by her minor son, the defendant, was injured in an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant, and sues her
son to recover damages for her injuries. Held, that a parent cannot sue a
minor child for a tort committed by the child. Schneider v. Schneider, 152 At.
498 (Md. I93o).
This case is particularly interesting in that it appears to be the first one
reported in which a parent sued a minor child for a tort. In the converse of
this situation, where the parent is the defendant in a tort action brought by
the child, recovery is almost universally denied' on the ground that such suit
would tend to break up the peace and harmony of the home and would subvert
the right of the parent to exercise discipline and authority over the child.- In
only one instance, a recent case decided in New Hampshire," has a different
result been reached. In that case, the court reasoned that in a suit arising out
of negligence in an automobile accident, no question of parental authority and
discipline is involved. It was further argued that in view of a contract of
insurance indemnifying the parent for loss, the several interests of the parent
and the child were not so opposed as to break up family peace and harmony.
In the principal case, the court based its decision on the fact that discord would
be introduced into the family circle by permitting the suit by the parent against
the minor child. This position was strengthened by citing cases holding that a
'In Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 271 Pac. 898 (1928)
it was held that mechanic's lien holders, with knowledge of a prior mortgage
and contract to make advances for construction purposes solely, were entitled
to priority over both mortgagor and mortgagee in the unadvanced balance of
the building loan, on the ground that they had reasonably relied in the tacit
representation of the parties to the loan agreement that all of the money would
be advanced for construction purposes. See Griffin v. New Jersey Oil Co., II
N. J. Eq. 49 (1855) ; cf. Witczinski v. Everman, supra note 4.
'Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (189i) ; Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928) ; Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C.
577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) ; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. . 131, 131 Ati. 198
(1925); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43
HARV. L. REv. 1o30.
"'To question the authority of the parent or to encourage the disobedience
of the child is to impair the peace and happiness of the family and undermine
the wholesome influence of the home. To permit a child to maintain an action
in tort against the parent is to introduce discord and contention where the laws
of nature have established peace and obedience," Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N. W. 787 (1927).
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 15o Atl. 905 (N. H. 1930) ; and see Note (1930) 79
U. OF PA. L. REv. 8o.
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guardian cannot sue his ward because of the relationship existing between them,'
and then reasoning that the relationship of parent and child and that of guardian
and ward are analogous. On the other hand, the fact that discord might be
introduced into the family relationship has not deterred some courts from
allowing a wife to maintain a suit against her husband under the Married Woman
Statutes,' nor has it deterred them from allowing a suit by the parent against
the minor child on a contract.' The court, in the principal case, might well
have adopted the view taken in the converse situation in the New Hampshire
case mentioned above ' since in the case of the parent suing the minor child no
question of domestic control is involved, and also because the defendant was
indemnified by liability insurance, thereby eliminating the reason that discord
would be introduced into the family relationship.

REcEIVER-SusPExSIoN

OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS

TO CLAIIAS

CaDITORs-Receiver, appointed upon the insolvency of a corporation, refused
to allow a claim which clearly was barrable by the Statute of Limitations unless
the running of the Statute was suspended by his appointment as receiver. Held,
that the claim was not barred by the Statute. Haas z. Sinaloa Exploration &
Development Company, 152 Atl. 216 (Del. 193o).
In the varying situations in which receivers are appointed, courts are not
in accord as to the effect of receivership upon the running of the Statute of
Limitations' against claims of creditors. It is generally held that bankruptcy
proceedings will suspend the Statute as jar as claims against the bankrupt
estate are concerned.' The rule, however, is otherwise where suit is brought
against the bankrupt himself where such bankrupt has failed to obtain a release
OF

'A father, guardian of his three minor children, could not maintain a suit
against them to divest them of their interest in certain real property, the prosecution of such suit being incompatible with the relationship of trust and confidence between him and his ward, Kidd v. Prince, 215 S. W. 844 (Tex. i919).
A guardian, mother of defendant, could not during the existence of that relationship maintain an action at law against the ward for necessaries furnished to
the ward, even if the guardian had no property of the ward in her possession.
McLane v. Curran, 133 Mass. 531 (1882).
' Bushnell v. Bushnell, io3 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925); Wait v. Pierce,
191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926).
'Hendrick v. Hendrick, i8o Ark. 550, 21 S. W. (2d) 961 (1929).
Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 3.
'Although suits against receivers are in equity, the doctrine is applicable,
that where legal rights are involved as contrasted to equitable rights, the
Statute of Limitations is a bar even in equity, Bell v. Giles Dyeing Mach. Co.,
37 F. (2d) 482 (C. C. A. 3d, I93O) ; Depew v. Colton, 6o N. J. Eq. 454, 46 Atl.
728 (i9oo) ; see Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 341.
'WOOD, LIMITATIONS (4th ed. 1916) § 202; cf. Ludowici Celadon Co. v.
Potter Title & Trust Co., 273 Fed. ioo9 (C. C. A. 3d, i92i) (lien of judgment
creditor) ; In re Chandler Motors, 17 F. (2d) 998 (D. C. Mass. 1926) (income
tax) ; (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 92.
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in bankruptcy.3 An assignment for the benefit of creditors suspends the statute.'
Similarly, receivership proceedings in the dissolution of a partnership' or a
corporation 6 halts the running of the Statute. These various principles, however, do not govern the instant case because this case deals with a receivership
on account of insolvency, and generally such a receivership does not effect a
dissolution of the corporation.' There is one case directly in point that arose
in Pennsylvania. It reaches the same conclusion as does the principal case but
it was not cited by the court. There have been several cases with conflicting
results where the issue was whether such a receivership should suspend the
Statute in regard to preferred claims.6 In solving the problem in the instant
case it is of no avail to call a receiver a trustee because that would simply be
begging the question. Similarly the determination of whether the receiver is
the representative of the creditors or of the corporation" is not very helpful
because even if it is granted that he represents the creditors, that does not mean
he acts for them in regard to their presentment of claims. A logical solution
depends upon the purpose of the Statute of Limitations. The generally recognized view is that the Statute is one of repose based on sound public policy."
Its purpose is to have disputes settled as soon as possible. When, however, a
receiver is appointed, it seems preferable that creditors should not press their
claims because the receiver should not be hindered by suits brought merely to
prevent the bar of the Statute. The reason for the rule being gone, it seems
that principles of business expediency would favor the suspension of the Statute
of Limitations when a receiver is appointed for an insolvent corporation."
'Maxwell v. Pappas, 173 Minn. 263, 217 N. W. 126 (I927); American
Woolen Co. v. Sanmuelsohn, 226 N. Y. 6I, 123 N. E. 154 (iig) ; Milne's Appeal,
99 Pa. 483 (1882).
45 Heckert's Appeal, 24 Pa. 482 (1855).
Engelhard v. Schroeder. 92 N. J. Eq. 663, 116 Atl. 717 (1921); Kirkpatrick v. McElroy, 41 N. J. Eq. 664, 7 At. 647 (1886).
'Ludington v. Thompson, 153 N. Y. 499, 47 N. E. 9o3 (1897). But see
England v. Hughes, 1I Ark. 235, 240, 217 S. W. 13, 14 (I91).
'HIGH, RECEIVERS (4th ed. 191o) 430.

'McGinnis v. Corporation Funding & Finance Co., 8 F. (2d) 532 (D. C.
Pa., 1925). But cf. Hammond v. Carthage Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 34 F.
(2d) 155 (D. C. N. Y., 1928) (filing of income tax claims with receiver was
held as commencement of proceedings for collection).
6 Two cases involving the lien of a judgment creditor hold the Statute continues to run. Savings & Trust Co. v. Bear Valley Irr. Co., 89 Fed. 32 (C. C.
Col. 1898), Skinner v. First Nat. Bank of Davis, 135 Okl. 61, 273 Pac. 893
(1928). But cf. McCormick v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 28 F. (2d) 331 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1928) (tax lien).
"See BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CoRPORATIONS (1927) 742; cf. Stokes v.
Williams, 249 Fed. II4 (C. C. A. 3d, I918).
' Bell v. Morrison, I Pet. 351, 36o (U. S. 1828).
21 ,n coming to its conclusion, the instant case proceeds on doubtful grounds.
It holds that even if the claim is barrable at law, yet the receiver is under its
orders and hence it will direct him not to plead the Statute because it would
be inequitable to plead it. The court says it would be inequitable because it
would be unjust to creditors and inconvenient for the administration of receiverships. The difficulty with this reasoning is that if the case is to be decided on
equitable grounds, the facts of the particular claim must be the basis for the
determination of the equities and not the comparative advantage of a change
in a rule of law.
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STREET

RAILWAYS-CARRIERS-WHEN

RELATIONSHIP

OF

PASSENGER

TO

CARRIER BEG.INs-Plaintiff stepped off curb and walked towards an approaching
street car which was at the time about sixty feet away. He gave no other
signal to the motorman, nor did the motorman apply the brakes or slacken the
speed of the car so as to receive him as a passenger. Automobile driver, noticing
that car was not slowing down, increased the speed of his machine to pass the
street car before it reached the corner; as a result, the automobile struck the
plaintiff. Plaintiff sued carrier on the theory that he had become a passenger
and therefore the carrier, in failing to slow down so that the automobile would
stop, violated the standard of care owed to plaintiff as a passenger. Defendant's motion for nonsuit was allowed. Held, no passenger relationship was
established and therefore the nonsuit is affirmed. Keiger v. Southern Public
Utilities Co., 155 S. E. 875 (N. C. 1930).
This case illustrates an interesting attempt to extend further the inception
of the passenger relationship so as to attain the unusual degree of care imposed
upon carriers. To give rise to the relationship of passenger and carrier, there
must be not only an intent on the part of the individual to avail himself of the
facilities of the carrier, but also an express or implied acceptance of the individual as a passenger by the carrier.' Courts naturally differ as to just what
facts will constitute this acceptance. It is unquestionably present when, upon
the car's stopping 2 or slowing down,3 the individual starts to enter. Some
courts have gone further in holding the passenger relationship fully established
whenever, in answer to a signal, the motorman acts so as clearly to show his
intent to stop the car to receive the individual.' Courts, howver, almost universally refuse to go beyond this point, and refuse to find that a mere signal
to the approaching car is in itself enough to make the individual a passenger.'
Two courts have held that a passenger relationship existed even though the
car in fact never stopped to receive the individual. In the one case' the motorman had blown the whistle, a fact which, under the view previously mentioned,
could reasonably be held to show his intent to stop. Hence, when injuries resulted to the plaintiff by the suction of air from the passing car the court found
' Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Thurlow, 178 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 8th, 191o);
Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Jennings, 190 Ill. 478, 6o N. E. 818 (I9oi) ; Hogner v.
Boston El. R. Co., 198 Mass. 260, 84 N. E. 464 (i9o8) ; Geiger v. Pittsburgh
R. Cos., 247 Pa. 287, 93 Ati. 342 (1915); 2 HUTCHINSON, CARRIERS (3d ed.
19o6) § 997.
'Bradley v. Williams, 2o Ala. App. 3o8, IO S. 8o8 (1924) ; Lavander v.
Chicago City R. R., 296 Ill. 284, 129 N. E. 757 (i92i) ; Gunn v. United R. R.
of St. Louis, 270 Mo. 517, 193 S. W.

814 (1917); 2 HUTCHINSON,

CARRTERS

(3d ed. i9o6) § ioo5.
3
Palfrey v. United R. R. S., 162 Mo. App. 470, 142 S. W. 773 (1912);
Vrooman v. Harvey, 197 S. W. 118 (Mo. 1917) ; Virginia R. R. Power Co. v
Arnold, 121 Va. 204, 92 S. E. 925 (1917).

'Spencer v. St. Louis Transit Co., 1I Mo. App. 653, 86 S. W. 593 (905);
Karr v. Milwaukee Light & R. Co., 132 Wis. 662, 171 Pac. 1169 (1918).
'Georgia & F. Ry. Co. v. Tapley, 144 Ga. 453, 87 S. E. 473 (1916) ; Welsh
v. Concord R. R. Co., 223 Mass. 184, 111 N. E. 693 (1916) ; La Belle v. Boston
Elev. R. Co., 265 Mass. 482, 164 N. E. 478 (1929).
'Rice v. Michigan R. R., 2o8 Mich. 123, 175 N. E. 454 (1919).
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liability, on the ground that the plaintiff was then the carrier's passenger. In
the other case' the individual was standing on the carrier's platform and was
injured in the same way by a gust of air caused by a passing car which failed
in any way to answer his signals. The court found a passenger relationship,
relying on a rather hazy conception of "constructive care." Certainly neither
of these cases stands as authority for the proposition that the carrier is liable
where the failure of the motorman to stop, coupled with the negligence of a
third person, caused the injuries. Since it is settled lav that the passenger
relationship can only commence after an acceptance of the individual by the
carrier either expressly or by implication, the court in the instant case quite
properly refused to conjure up doctrines of constructive care; or legally to find
acts of acceptance to be present when factually they were not.
'

Grand Falls & 0. D. R. R. v. Hammerly, 40 App. D. C. io6,

(913).

